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1. Introduction 
The need for sustainable energy production leads to an increasing share of wind power 
production especially in northern Europe, along the coast of the Northern Sea. The intermittent 
wind power production results in a need for regulating resources to keep the electricity system in 
balance. The Nordic, especially the Norwegian hydro based power production has good 
capabilities for offering such regulating resources, utilizing the increasing interconnection 
capacity between the Nordic and the continental European power system. Contemporaneously the 
European Union enforces the liberalization and integration of the national European power 
markets. In order to exchange regulating resources, a reservation of transmission capacity on the 
interconnections might be beneficial. Some studies, which are done on a simplified level based 
on a statistical analysis, show a benefit of reserving transmission capacity for the regulating 
resource exchange [1], [2]. However, the withdrawal of transmission capacity from the day-ahead 
market is not taken into account in [1]. Further on a capacity of 100MW is planned to be reserved 
for the exchange of regulating resources on the new Skagerrak 4 cable, connecting Norway and 
Denmark [3]. This paper analyzes the effects of reserving transmission capacity for the regulating 
power market on the links between the Nordic area and continental Europe. 
 
2. Market designs 
Aiming at a desired exchange of regulating resources between different countries, it is important 
to take into account the individual balancing market designs in these countries. An important 
point here is that these markets are compatible. The area covered in this paper’s analysis is shown 
in Fig. 1. As discussed in [4] and [5] there are huge differences between the individual markets, 
especially between the continental European and the Nordic ones. One of the most important 
differences is the program time unit (PTU) length, being 15 min in continental Europe and 1 hour 
in the Nordic countries. Other important issues are the use of secondary control in continental 
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Europe and tertiary control in Scandinavia, and the different gate closure times. These design 
differences result in different bidding behaviour and market clearing results as it is shown in [5]. 
In order to simulate an integrated northern European regulating power market for the model 
which the analysis of this paper is based on, a common design for the regulating power market is 
assumed. This especially concerns the PTU-length and the sequence of the different markets. 
 
3. Market model 
A three stage fundamental model is used in this analysis, depicted in Fig.2, which is presented in 
detail in [4]. It simulates an integrated northern European regulating power market, which is 
Tab. 1: Modelled control areas [4] 
1 
Southern Norway 
(Statnett) 
2 
Middle Norway 
(Statnett) 
3 
Northern Norway 
(Statnett) 
4 
Sweden 
(Svenska Kraftnät) 
5 
Finland 
(Fingrid) 
6 
Denmark 
(energinet.dk) 
7 
Eastern Germany 
(50 Hertz) 
8 
Middle Germany 
(transpower) 
9 
Western Germany 
(Amprion) 
10 
South-western Germany 
(EnBW) 
11 
Netherlands 
(TenneT) 
 
 
Fig. 1: Geographic overview of modelled areas [4] 
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based on a common day-ahead market, including the Nordic countries Denmark, Finland, 
Norway, Sweden and the continental European countries Germany and the Netherlands, as shown 
in Fig. 1.  
Fig. 2: Model structure and workflow [4] 
The simulation is split in two general parts, represented by two different models, which are EFI’s 
Multi-area Power-market Simulator (EMPS) and the Integrated Regulating power market in 
Europe (IRiE) respectively. The EMPS model represents a long- and mid-term optimisation, 
whereas IRiE has a short-term horizon. In the following the three subsequent steps are described 
in some more detail.  
3.1. Day-ahead market 
The day-ahead market step is implemented by EMPS [6]. This model developed by SINTEF 
Energy Research is a long- and mid-term optimisation model determining the socio-economic 
optimal dispatch of electricity generation on a weekly basis, assuming perfect market behaviour 
with a time horizon of several years. Weeks are divided in several subsequent periods, by which 
an hourly resolution of the optimisation process can be achieved. 
The division in different day-ahead market areas is shown in Fig. 1. The in- and outputs of EMPS 
are indicated in Fig. 2. The transmission lines connecting the areas are modelled by net transfer 
 - Generation 
redispatch 
Reserve 
requirements: 
- Control area 
- Balancing area 
- System wide 
System imbalance: 
- Demand forecast error 
- Wind forecast error 
- Water values 
- Area prices 
System
 
balancing 
R
eserve 
procurem
ent 
- Reserve 
procurement cost 
- Availability of 
regulating reserves 
- System balancing 
cost 
- Regulating resource 
exchange 
- Total production cost 
- Area prices 
- Optimal generation dispatch 
- Transmission dispatch 
- Water values 
- Area prices 
- Power plant data 
- Transmission system data 
 
- Demand, Ex-&Import curves 
- Hydro inflow, wind speeds 
D
ay-ahead 
m
arket 
EMPS IRiE
 4
capacities (NTC) including linear losses. The results and output of this model is the optimal 
generation dispatch, area prices and the water values for the Nordic reservoirs. The water values 
are the opportunity costs of the stored water and are used as production costs for the hydro power 
plants in the subsequent steps. 
A further and more detailed description of EMPS can be found in [6]. 
3.2. Reserve Procurement 
During the reserve procurement a redispatch of the optimal generation dispatch obtained from the 
day-ahead market is done in order to fulfil the given reserve requirements in the control areas. 
This means, regulating reserves can not only be procured in the own control area, but also in 
other areas. As the reserve procurement is done after the day-ahead market clearing, the 
remaining transmission capacity is taken into account. The reserve procurement is done for each 
individual hour, taking into account start-up costs of thermal units and their reduced efficiency at 
partial load. 
The reservation is done in a socio-economic optimal way, based on marginal production costs of 
the thermal units and the water values for the hydro power plants. A detailed description of the 
procurement process can be found in [4]. 
3.3. System Balancing 
The third step covers the system balancing, by activating the least-cost regulating reserves in 
order to compensate the system imbalance. The available transmission capacities are taken into 
account. In order to account for the geographic spread of the analysed system, the transmission 
losses are included by a linear approximation. The balancing is done for each PTU using 
recorded imbalances from the respective control areas as an input. The costs for balancing the 
system are rough estimates based on the marginal production costs of thermal units and the water 
values for hydro units. However, the definition of balancing costs is done in a way that supports a 
utilization of hydro regulating reserves instead of thermal ones. A further and more detailed 
description of the system balancing can be found in [4]. 
4. Case studies 
In order to answer the question raised in the title of this paper several case studies are done. As a 
basis for the study the previously described model is used, representing the 2008’s state of the 
power system. The here presented analysis is made for an average year with respect to the inflow 
to the Nordic hydro system, which in this case is 192 TWh per annum.  
The studied cases differ in the available transmission capacity for the day-ahead market. The 
capacity reservation is only done on lines connecting the Nordic countries and continental 
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Europe, which are the NorNed-, the Baltic- and the Kontek-HVDC cables and the Denmark-west 
/ Germany AC interconnector. In the first case the full transmission capacity is offered to the day-
ahead market. After the day-ahead market clearing, the remaining transmission capacity can be 
used for trading in the regulating power market. For the further two studied cases the 
transmission capacity offered to the day-ahead market on the previously mentioned lines is 
decreased by 5% and 10% respectively in order to reserve this capacity for the exchange of 
regulating reserves. The reservation is done for the exchange of up- as well as downward 
regulating reserves. In these cases the remaining transmission capacity after day-ahead market 
clearing plus the reserved capacity is offered to the regulating power market, including the 
reserve procurement and the system balancing. The nominal transmission capacities of the 
relevant lines can be found in Tab. 2. 
 
Tab. 2: Nominal transmission of lines connecting Nordic and continental European countries 
 NorNed Baltic Kontek DK / DE int. 
Countries NO - NL SWE - DE DK - DE DK - DE 
NTC to 700 525 550 1400 
NTC from 700 400 550 800 
5. Results 
The results of the case studies for reserving transmission capacity are shown in Tab. 3 for the 
day-ahead market outcome and in Tab. 4 for the regulating power market outcome. Results for 
the cases of full capacity available to the day-ahead market, a 5% and a 10% reservation capacity 
are shown in the subsequent tables. In addition the case of no integration of the northern 
European regulating power markets as discussed in [4] is shown as a comparison to classify the 
transmission reservation outcomes. 
Table 3 shows that the reservation of transmission capacity and thus withdrawal of trading 
possibilities from the day-ahead market has a strong impact on the outcome of the day-ahead 
market clearing. The reservation of transmission capacity for balancing reduces the socio-
economic benefit by decreasing the dispatched exchange of electricity between the Nordic area 
and continental Europe, by about 4% and 8%. However, the outcomes are quite different for the 
various market participants. A distinction must be made between Nordic and continental 
European participants, as there is a price decrease in the Nordic countries and increase in the 
continental countries. Due to this price changes, as it can be expected there is a benefit for 
continental producers and a loss for continental consumers. In the Nordic area the outcome is the 
opposite, with large losses for the Nordic producers. For the TSOs the reduction of available 
transmission capacity on the day-ahead market is slightly beneficial. Looking on the individual 
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transmission lines on which capacity is reserved, it shows that there are different outcomes too. A 
benefit can be seen on the Denmark-west Germany interconnector. For the Kontek and the Baltic 
cable there is no change, whereas on the NorNed cable a loss can be seen. An explanation for 
benefit for the TSOs of reserving transmission capacity can be that the reservation brings the 
available transmission capacity to the day-ahead market closer to the optimal transmission 
capacity for a TSO. The income to the TSOs is the Congestion capacity cost, as defined in [7]. 
This income for the TSO is maximized if the available transmission capacity is 50% of the 
transmission capacity which is necessary in order not to have congestions on the transmission 
line. 
Tab. 3: Day-ahead market outcome of reserving transmission capacity 
 No integration Full integration 5% reservation 10% reservation 
Socio-economic outcome - - -79.46 M€ -260.25 M€ 
Gross exchange 17.42 TWh 17.42 TWh 16.85 TWh 16.26 TWh 
TSO outcome - - 0.038 M€ 0.226 M€ 
Nordic producer outcome - - -82.1 M€ -276.98 M€ 
Nordic consumer outcome - - 17.31 M€ 37.46 M€ 
DE+NL producer outcome - - 7.53 M€ 29.67 M€ 
DE+NL consumer outcome - - -19.79 M€ -44.52 M€ 
 
In total it can be seen that there is no linear change of the economic outcome with the amount of 
capacity reservation. With a 10% reservation of transmission capacity for the exchange of 
regulating resources there is a significant higher decrease of the socio-economic benefit, as well 
as losses for the Nordic producers and benefits for the continental producers compared with the 
5% reservation. 
 
Tab. 4: Regulating power market outcome of reserving transmission capacity 
 No integration Full integration 5% reservation 10% reservation 
Reserve procurement costs 167.47 M€ 44.36 M€ 39.78 M€ 36.08 M€ 
Average reserves procured from 
Nordic area to DE / NL 
0 1.305 GW 1.407 GW 1.431 GW 
Redispatch 3111 GWh 2069 GWh 1997 GWh 1952 GWh 
     
Balance settlement costs 119.4 M€ 62.14 M€ 54.29 M€ 47.69 M€ 
Activated upward reserves 4019 GWh 3177 GWh 3111 GWh 3069 GWh 
Activated downward reserves -4131 GWh -3284 GWh -3211 GWh -3165 GWh 
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Tab. 4 (continued): Regulating power market outcome of reserving transmission capacity 
 No integration Full integration 5% reservation 10% reservation 
Net exchange 0 131 GWh 89.2 GWh 40.9 GWh 
Gross exchange 0 2853 GWh 3101 GWh 3579 GWh 
TSO income 0 5.63 M€ 11.76 M€ 16.25 M€ 
 
Tab. 4 shows the outcome on the regulating power market due to the reservation of transmission 
capacity. Here the outcomes for the reserve procurement as well as the system balancing are 
shown. By the capacity reservation the reserve procurement costs are reduced with 10% and 20% 
respectively, but compared to the process of integrating the markets this is only a minor benefit. 
The increase in the externally procured reserves is also only marginal, resulting in a minor 
reduction of the necessary redispatch during the reserve procurement. An explanation for it can 
be that normally there is already enough free capacity available after the day-ahead market 
clearing. In the hours where this is not the case the reservation of 5% or 10% of transmission 
capacity is not enough to increase the procurable reserves significantly. 
The balance settlement costs are reduced by about 11% and 20% respectively by the additional 
available transmission capacity for the exchange of regulating resources. The reservation of 
capacity for balancing reduces the total activated reserves slightly by an increased netting of 
imbalances. The gross exchange of regulating resources between the Nordic and the continental 
European countries increases significantly by 10% and 25%, whereat the net exchange of 
regulating resources is reduced, which means that nearly as much down- as upward regulating 
resources are exported to continental Europe. The increase in the exchange of regulating 
resources results in an additional benefit for the TSOs, which is tripled in the case of reserving 
10% of transmission capacity for the exchange of regulating resources.  
Combining the outcome of the day-ahead market and the regulating power market shows that 
there is a benefit for the TSOs to reserve transmission capacity for the exchange of regulating 
resources. As the transmission lines are operated by the TSOs, they have an incentive for the 
reservation of transmission capacity, although this would reduce the socio-economic benefit 
significantly.  
Fig. 3 shows the duration curve of the aggregated real-time exchange on the lines connecting the 
Nordic and the continental European area. It can be seen that in the cases of capacity reservation 
the full capacity of the lines is used quite seldom, about 1000 hours per annum, whereat in the 
case of full capacity available to the day-ahead market the full capacity is used in about 2000 
hours of the year. 
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Fig. 3: Real-time exchange between Nordic and continental European countries 
 
In Fig. 4 the duration curve of the exchange of regulating resources is shown for the different 
cases studied. In the case of no integration there is by definition no exchange of regulating 
resources. There is only a small difference between the case of full integration and the case of 
additional reservation of 10% of transmission capacity. The increased exchange is mainly during 
the hours, where there is only little exchange of regulating resources, which probably results from 
additional netting of imbalances. This also results in less activation of regulating reserves in the 
continental countries as will be discussed subsequently. 
Fig. 4: Real-time exchange of regulating resources between Nordic 
and continental European countries 
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The activated reserves in the transpower area (Fig. 5) and southern Norway (Fig. 6) are depicted 
in duration curves below. For southern Norway there is an increase in the activation of the 
reserves with the integration of regulating power markets, whereas the increase due to the 
reservation of transmission capacity is only marginal. For the transpower area the impact is the 
opposite. There is a significant reduction of activated regulating reserves coming with the 
integration of the regulating power markets. The reservation of capacity for the exchange of 
regulating resources reduces such activation even more. It can also be seen that due to the 
exchange of regulating resources there are about 7500 hours of the year without activation of 
reserves in this area, which are even more in the case of capacity reservation. The increase of the 
time, where there is no activation of regulating reserves is due to the netting of imbalances and 
the activation of cheaper hydro regulating situated in the Nordic countries instead of the thermal 
ones in the continental countries. 
The decrease of activated reserves results in a significant decrease of the expected income for 
participants bidding in the regulating power market in continental Europe. As regulating reserves 
are activated only in a few hours during a year, it becomes much more improbable for a 
regulating power market participant to get his bid of regulating energy accepted. Thus it becomes 
much harder to recover fixed costs on the plants which are used for the provision of regulating 
reserves by the sale of regulating energy. The procurement of regulating reserves by a capacity 
payment for providing regulating reserves become more important in this case, which can be used 
to recover the fixed cost of the power plants. 
Fig. 5: Regulating reserve activation in Germany (transpower area) 
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Fig. 6: Regulating reserve activation in southern Norway 
 
In addition to the reduction of activated reserves also the maximum activated upward regulating 
reserves are reduced by about 200MW, whereat the maximum activated downward reserves are 
increased by about 300MW. This shows that a reduction of the reserve requirements in this 
control area would be possible. 
 
6. Discussion 
The reservation of transmission capacity has a significant impact on the day-ahead market 
outcome, which is shown by the utilization of the EMPS model. This model is widely used in the 
Nordic area for price forecasting and production planning, thus being quite reliable. On the other 
hand there is a reduction of reserve procurement and system balancing cost. Especially for the 
system balancing costs, it has to be said, that these are rough estimates, giving an indication but 
still being uncertain to some extend. Instead of analysing the resulting costs, the resulting 
exchange of reserves and regulating energy is quite reliable. It shows a high opportunity of 
exchanging those between the Nordic and the continental European countries. 
As mentioned in [3] on the planned Skagerrak 4 connector between Norway and Denmark 
100MW of transmission capacity shall be reserved in order to exchange regulating resources. It is 
justified by the high cost of regulating resources in Denmark. The analysis in this paper shows 
that by a reservation of transmission capacity the reserve procurement and system balancing costs 
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can be reduced. However, as discussed before this reduction comes at a socio-economic loss in 
the day-ahead market, which mainly concerns the Nordic countries. It is stated that the trade per 
MW in the regulating power market is more beneficial than trading in the day-ahead market. This 
is validated in this paper as it is shown a capacity reservation is beneficial in total for the TSOs. 
Thus it can be said the statement is correct for a TSO, but not in the socio-economic perspective. 
 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper an estimation of the socio-economic outcome of the reservation of transmission 
capacity for the exchange of regulating reserves in the northern European area is done. The 
results show that a small reservation of transmission capacity increases the exchange of 
regulating resources significantly. This also results in a significant reduction of reserve 
procurement and balancing costs. However, this cost reduction is far lower than the decrease in 
the socio-economic benefit in the day-ahead market. Looking at different participants in the day-
ahead market it turns out that the outcome of this reservation is different for producers, 
consumers and the TSOs. Especially for the TSOs there is a benefit of reserving transmission 
capacity for reserves in both the day-ahead market and the regulating power market. As the TSOs 
are operating the lines, the analysis suggests that it would be profitable for them to implement 
such a capacity reservation. This calls for an active role of the regulators in order to achieve the 
best socio-economic outcome. The overall decrease of the socio-economic benefit suggests that 
such reservation is not profitable to be implemented. 
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